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The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?

  1. Tim Büthe1,
  2. Helen V. Milner2

Article first published online: 29 SEP 2008

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x

Issue

American Journal of Political Science

American Journal of Political Science

Volume 52, Issue 4, pages 741–762, October 2008

Additional Information

How to Cite

Büthe, T. and Milner, H. V. (2008), The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?. American Journal of Political Science, 52: 741–762. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x

Author Information

  1. 1

    Duke University

  2. 2

    Princeton University

*Tim Büthe (corresponding author) is assistant professor of political science, Duke University, on leave 2007–09 while a RWJ Foundation Research Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley; 303 Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0204 (buthe@duke.edu; http://www.buthe.info). Helen V. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, chair of its Department of Politics and director of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, 431 Robertson Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (hmilner@princeton.edu; http://www.princeton.edu/~hmilner/).

  1. For comments on previous versions of this article, we are grateful to Nancy Brune, Mark Buntaine, Kevin Davis, Jeff Frieden, Joanne Gowa, Joseph Grieco, Nate Jensen, Judith Kelley, Thomas Kenyon, Benedict Kingsbury, Quan Li, Eddy Malesky, Mark Manger, Guillermo Rosas, Shanker Satyanath, Andrew Sobel, and participants of presentations at APSA 2004; Duke University; University of California, San Diego; Washington University; New York University School of Law; and Stanford Law School, as well as the editor and anonymous reviewers of AJPS. We thank Nancy Brune, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Zach Elkins, Witold Henisz, Jon Pevehouse, Beth Simmons, WDI, and UNCTAD for making data available to us; and we thank Matt Fehrs, Tom Kenyon, Ivan Savic, and especially Raymond Hicks for research assistance.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 29 SEP 2008
  2. Article first published online: 29 SEP 2008

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