Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 63rd annual national conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, the 22nd Annual Summer Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, Tallahassee, and workshops at Harvard University. Thanks to Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones for making their data public, Barry C. Burden, Leif-Eric Easley, Andrew Eggers, Benjamin Goodrich, Michael Kellermann, Jeffrey Lazarus, and three anonymous referees for their comments and help. This research is supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Systematically Dependent Competing Risks and Strategic Retirement
Version of Record online: 23 JUN 2009
©2009, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 53, Issue 3, pages 740–754, July 2009
How to Cite
Fukumoto, K. (2009), Systematically Dependent Competing Risks and Strategic Retirement. American Journal of Political Science, 53: 740–754. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00398.x
- Issue online: 23 JUN 2009
- Version of Record online: 23 JUN 2009
In many applications of survival analysis, the risk of an event occurring for one reason is dependent on the risk of the same event occurring for another reason. For example, when politicians suspect they might lose an election, they may strategically choose to retire. In such situations, the often-used multinomial logit model suffers from bias and underestimates the degree of strategic retirement, for example, to what extent poor prior electoral performance diminishes electoral prospects. To address this problem, the present article proposes a systematically dependent competing-risks (SDCR) model of survival analysis. Unlike the frailty model, the SDCR model can also deal with more than two risks. Monte Carlo simulation demonstrates how much the SDCR model reduces bias. Reanalysis of data on U.S. congressional careers (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004) documents the strategic retirement of representatives, indicating that electoral pressure is more effective at turning out incumbents than previously recognized.