The author would like to thank Emily Beaulieu, Wonbin Cho, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Paul Hensel, Kelly M. Kadera, Michael T. Koch, Brian Lai, Sara Mitchell, Sarah Morey, Mark Peffley, Clayton Thyne, Steve Voss, Justin Wedeking, and the anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own. All modeling and statistical replication files are available at http://www.uky.edu/~dsmore2.
When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process
Version of Record online: 6 JAN 2011
©2011, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 55, Issue 2, pages 263–275, April 2011
How to Cite
Morey, D. S. (2011), When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process. American Journal of Political Science, 55: 263–275. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00488.x
- Issue online: 1 APR 2011
- Version of Record online: 6 JAN 2011
This study develops a dynamic model of the rivalry process, explicitly connecting the conflicts that form rivalries. The model demonstrates how these conflicts combine to form an especially conflict-prone relationship. Using numerical simulations of the model, I deduce and test a hypothesis connecting dyadic conflict and rivalry termination. High-concentration conflicts increase the probability of rivalry termination by causing a sharp and sustained drop in public support for future military action. Dyadic conflict between rivals can bring peace, under the right circumstances. The article concludes with a discussion of the model's implications for policymakers seeking to limit international violence.