When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process

Authors


  • The author would like to thank Emily Beaulieu, Wonbin Cho, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Paul Hensel, Kelly M. Kadera, Michael T. Koch, Brian Lai, Sara Mitchell, Sarah Morey, Mark Peffley, Clayton Thyne, Steve Voss, Justin Wedeking, and the anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own. All modeling and statistical replication files are available at http://www.uky.edu/~dsmore2.

Daniel S. Morey is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 1615 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506-0027 (daniel-morey@uky.edu).

Abstract

This study develops a dynamic model of the rivalry process, explicitly connecting the conflicts that form rivalries. The model demonstrates how these conflicts combine to form an especially conflict-prone relationship. Using numerical simulations of the model, I deduce and test a hypothesis connecting dyadic conflict and rivalry termination. High-concentration conflicts increase the probability of rivalry termination by causing a sharp and sustained drop in public support for future military action. Dyadic conflict between rivals can bring peace, under the right circumstances. The article concludes with a discussion of the model's implications for policymakers seeking to limit international violence.

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