For helpful comments, we thank Scott Ashworth, Steve Callander, Keith Krehbiel, Alessandro Lizzeri, Adam Meirowitz, Alan Wiseman, and seminar audiences at Caltech, Georgetown, Harvard, Kellogg, Maryland, Ohio State, Stony Brook, APSA 2008, and MPSA 2008.
Policy-Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power
Article first published online: 13 SEP 2011
© 2011, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 56, Issue 1, pages 67–83, January 2012
How to Cite
Hirsch, A. V. and Shotts, K. W. (2012), Policy-Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power. American Journal of Political Science, 56: 67–83. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00538.x
- Issue published online: 17 JAN 2012
- Article first published online: 13 SEP 2011
•Section 1 proves main substantive results hold if the valence of the status quo is strictly greater than zero.
• Section 2 provides a complete set of results for the committee composition game (these results are used to generate the example in the main text).
• Section 3 analyzes a variant of our model in which valence is transferable by the committee but not expropriable by the floor.
|AJPS_538_sm_SuppMat.pdf||186K||Supporting info item|
Please note: Wiley Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.