We thank the following people for comments and suggestions: Huda Ahmed, Eli Berman, Chris Blattman, LTC Liam Collins, LTC Lee Ewing, Jim Fearon, COL Joe Felter, Kelly Grieco, Paul Huth, Kosuke Imai, Radha Iyengar, Stathis Kalyvas, Adam Meirowitz, Ulrich Müller, Doug Ollivant, Ken Schultz, Gaby Guerrero Serdán, Paul Staniland, John Stark, Elizabeth Wood, MAJ Matt Zais, and participants at the 2009 and 2010 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, the Contentious Politics Workshop at the University of Maryland, College Park, and the Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence colloquium at Yale University, in addition to three anonymous reviewers and the AJPS editors. We thank Josh Borkowski, Zeynep Bulutgil, and Nils Weidmann for coding the district-level estimates of sectarian population. Most importantly, we thank our colleagues at Iraq Body Count for their years of hard work documenting the human costs of the war in Iraq. This material is based upon work supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) under Award No. FA9550–09–1–0314, by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Award No. CNS-0905086, and by the Army Research Office (ARO) under Award No. W911NF-11–1–0036. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the AFOSR, United States Department of Defense, NSF, or ARO. The Supplemental Evidence and data used for this article are available at http://www.princeton.edu/∼jns/.
Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage
Version of Record online: 14 SEP 2011
© 2011, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 56, Issue 1, pages 167–187, January 2012
How to Cite
Condra, L. N. and Shapiro, J. N. (2012), Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage. American Journal of Political Science, 56: 167–187. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00542.x
- Issue online: 17 JAN 2012
- Version of Record online: 14 SEP 2011
1A & 1B: Shows that measurement error in IBC-based civilian casualty data is unlikely to be nonrandom with respect to levels of insurgent violence.
1C: Provides descriptive statistics for the full country and Sunni, mixed, and Shiite areas.
2A: Shows core results are robust to controlling for preexisting trends in attacks and district FE to pick up predictable heterogeneity in trends.
2B: Shows core results robust to dropping Baghdad.
2C: Shows placebo test on core results.
2D: Shows results of trying to predict civilian casualties with leads of SIGACTs.
2E: Shows core results are not present if difference between lagged attacks and average over t to t+3 is placed on LHS.
2F: Shows core results are stronger in areas with more than the median proportion of their population (48.5%) living in urban areas.
2G: Shows core results for different kinds of insurgent attacks.
2H: Shows core results on insurgent killings are robust to population-weighting districts. Coalition results become statistically weaker.
2I: Shows core results on insurgent killings are robust to using the log of casualties on the RHS. Coalition results become statistically weaker.
2J: Shows core results in the full regression (column 5) are robust to including the count of incidents by each party on the RHS.
2K: Shows core results in the full regression (column 5) are robust to allowing a mean shift for district-weeks in which civilians are killed.
2L: Shows core results on insurgent killings are robust to including spatial lag of incidents on the RHS. Coalition results become statistically weaker.
2M: Shows core results are robust to allowing mean shift for any week that includes the first day of the month (to which we attribute killings identified through morgue reports).
2N: Shows core results on Coalition killings are robust to dropping the 7.6% of incidents involving both Coalition and insurgent killings. Insurgent results become statistically weaker.
2O: Shows difference between Sunni and mixed districts in Table 4 is robust to dropping the 7.6% of incidents involving both Coalition and insurgent killings.
2P: Shows core results with Coalition and insurgent killings per 100,000 on RHS.
3: Shows the impact of population density and urbanity on civilian casualty ratios.
4: Shows the impact of CERP projects and spending on civilian casualty ratios.
5: Shows effects of a one-SD increase in civilian casualties on rate of insurgent attacks in different periods.
Figure 5A shows an alternative matching solution to that described in the text.
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