In “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy“ (American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 971-89 (2009)), there is a slight error in the proof of Proposition 3. Specifically, Congress's C's payoff from deviating to a pure strategy, should be given by . C's strategy from playing a pure strategy is given by . Thus, the mixing probability that makes C indifferent between playing and is . This probability holds for all . Thus, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 exists for all .
Note that this correction does not affect the substantive interpretation of the model or the empirical implications derived. In the article, analysis was constrained to the case where . Thus, for low values of p, specifically , it was claimed that three equilibria exist. For , there exists a separating equilibrium in which the Court always makes a constrained decision upon observing Court curbing. For , there exists a semi separating equilibrium in which the Court probabilistically makes a constrained decision upon observing Court curbing. For , it was asserted there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the Court never makes a constrained decision upon observing Court curbing. The comparative static derived was that as increases—as the Court and Congress become more ideologically divergent—the Court should be less likely to make a constrained decision upon observing Court curbing. The algebraic correction reveals that the semi separating equilibrium holds for all , and the restriction that is not necessary. However, the probability with which the Court makes an unconstrained decision upon observing Court curbing , , is increasing in . Thus, the prediction that judicial restraint in response to Court curbing should decrease as Congress becomes more ideologically divergent from the Court continues to hold.