An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. We thank the Princeton Survey Research Center for careful data collection and essential advice. We thank Michael Herron for helpful comments. Ideal point estimates and other data from this article are available for download at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/, http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/idealpoints, http://www.christiangrose.net, or http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/SFGS/.
Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress
Article first published online: 21 NOV 2011
© 2012, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 56, Issue 2, pages 341–354, April 2012
How to Cite
Clinton, J. D., Bertelli, A., Grose, C. R., Lewis, D. E. and Nixon, D. C. (2012), Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 56: 341–354. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00559.x
- Issue published online: 16 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 21 NOV 2011
Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats and agencies that are directly comparable with those of other political actors. These estimates produce insights into the nature of the bureaucratic state and provide traction on a host of questions about American politics. We discuss what these estimates reveal about the political environment of bureaucracy and their potential for testing theories of political institutions. We demonstrate their utility by testing key propositions from Gailmard and Patty's (2007) influential model of political control and endogenous expertise development.