The authors wish to thank Martin F. Hellwig, Christoph Engel, Andreas Glöckner, Ben Domingue, Beaugitte Laurent, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and the Max Planck International Research Network on Aging (MaxNetAging) for financial support. The replication dataset can be downloaded from http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17004. The R source code is available in the supporting information online.
Information Exchange in Policy Networks
Version of Record online: 21 FEB 2012
© 2012, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 56, Issue 3, pages 731–744, July 2012
How to Cite
Leifeld, P. and Schneider, V. (2012), Information Exchange in Policy Networks. American Journal of Political Science, 56: 731–744. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00580.x
- Issue online: 16 JUL 2012
- Version of Record online: 21 FEB 2012
Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust, and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by institutional, relational, and social opportunity structures. Political actors choose contacts who minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.