I would like to thank Kenichi Ariga, Barry C. Burden, John C. Campbell, William R. Clark, Kentaro Fukumoto, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Hiroshi Hirano, Orit Kedar, Arthur Lupia, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Daisuke Nakajima, Nils Ringe, Jun Saito, Susumu Shikano, Yutaka Shinada, Masaki Taniguchi, Kharis Templeman, the editor, and four anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Yukio Maeda for sharing his Japanese public opinion data. This research was supported in part by the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan. Replication data can be found at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~onoy/.
Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan
Version of Record online: 16 MAR 2012
© 2012, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 56, Issue 3, pages 553–567, July 2012
How to Cite
Ono, Y. (2012), Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan. American Journal of Political Science, 56: 553–567. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00586.x
- Issue online: 16 JUL 2012
- Version of Record online: 16 MAR 2012
Figure 3: Marginal Effect of External Popularity and Predicted Portfolio Share
Table 4: Effects of Party Fragmentation, Internal Strength, and External Popularity on Rival Faction's Portfolio Share
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