Critical Reflections on Hamiltonian Perspectives on Rule-Making and Legislative Proposal Initiatives by the Chief Executive

Authors


Stephanie P. Newbold is an assistant professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Dallas. Her research interests include constitutional theory, ethics, administrative history, and the legal environment of public affairs. She is part of the Constitutional School of public administration.
E-mail: stephanie.newbold@utdallas.edu

David H. Rosenbloom is a distinguished professor of public administration at American University in Washington, D.C. He received the Dwight Waldo Award in 1999 and the John Gaus Award in 2001. His scholarship focuses on public administration and democratic constitutionalism.
E-mail: rbloom@american.edu

Abstract

Reflecting on James Hart and Edwin Witte’s analysis affords the field a rare opportunity to observe the complexities of a separation-of-powers system in action. In making their case, they underscored the importance of the president having a substantial supervisory role in the way administrative agencies write rules and propose legislative measures. As a result, they ignored Congress’s constitutional responsibility to supervise, regulate, and guide these areas of administrative law. Their highly controversial arguments not only provide the field with a broader understanding of the overall mission of the Brownlow Committee, but also we can see how they influenced the development of the administrative state.

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