Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs, Bargaining Power or Stigma?
Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
© 2010 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association
Real Estate Economics
Volume 39, Issue 1, pages 19–43, Spring 2011
How to Cite
Turnbull, G. K. and Zahirovic-Herbert, V. (2011), Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs, Bargaining Power or Stigma?. Real Estate Economics, 39: 19–43. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00285.x
- Issue online: 27 JAN 2011
- Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
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