*Direct correspondence to Miriam A. Golden, Department of Political Science, Box 951472, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095 〈firstname.lastname@example.org〉. Data and other materials necessary to replicate this study are available at 〈http://www.golden.polisci.ucla.edu〉 or upon request to the author. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30–September 3. The authors are grateful to Barbara Geddes for making her data available to us and to Elizabeth Carlson for research assistance. Helpful suggestions were offered by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Michael Ross, Andrea Vindigni, and Jessica Weeks.
Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes*
Article first published online: 11 JAN 2010
© 2010 by the Southwestern Social Science Association
Social Science Quarterly
Volume 91, Issue 1, pages 1–20, March 2010
How to Cite
Chang, E. and Golden, M. A. (2010), Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes. Social Science Quarterly, 91: 1–20. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00678.x
- Issue published online: 11 JAN 2010
- Article first published online: 11 JAN 2010
Objectives. We seek to investigate the determinants of corruption in authoritarian polities. We hypothesize that corruption in nondemocratic settings will be greater where the ruling group is personalistic rather than a political party or a military clique and that it will be greater where rulers expect to remain in power longer. We construct a new operationalization of the selectorate theory advanced by Bueno de Mesquita et al.
Methods. We use cross-sectional statistical analysis (OLS) to examine a sample of 40-odd authoritarian regimes as of 2000.
Results. Our results indicate that personalistic and personalistic-hybrid regimes are more prone to corruption than single-party and military regimes and also that rulers who expect to remain in power for longer are less corrupt. Corroborating previous studies, we document that the availability of natural resources and higher levels of institutionalized autocracy are associated with greater corruption and that wealthier countries experience less corruption. Our results are consistent with previous studies, including that of Bueno de Mesquita et al., but because of our reconstruction of selectorate theory in terms of real-world regime types, they are more easily interpretable.
Conclusions. Our study sheds light on why African countries are so notoriously corrupt. The personalistic authoritarian regimes that have arisen there in the postcolonial period appear especially prone to corruption, whereas military and single-party dictatorships are less corrupt.