Kevin Henrickson shall share all data and coding for replication purposes. We are extremely appreciative of the insightful comments that we received on this article at both the 2010 Public Choice Society Annual Meetings and the 2010 Midwest Economic Association Annual Meetings.
Original Article
The Effect of the Top Two Primary on the Number of Primary Candidates†
Article first published online: 22 JUN 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00876.x
© 2012 by the Southwestern Social Science Association
Issue

Social Science Quarterly
Early View (Online Version of Record published before inclusion in an issue)
Additional Information
How to Cite
Beck, J. H. and Henrickson, K. E. (2012), The Effect of the Top Two Primary on the Number of Primary Candidates. Social Science Quarterly. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00876.x
- †
Publication History
- Article first published online: 22 JUN 2012
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Objectives
Washington State held its first “top two primary” in 2008. Under this system, the two candidates receiving the most votes move on to the general election, regardless of party affiliation. This study empirically examines the potential incentive under this top two primary system for each political party to discourage “excess” party candidates from entering primary contests.
Methods
We examine this possibility by looking at the Washington State Legislative Primaries in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. With these data, we estimate the factors impacting the number of primary candidates in a race for each political party, including the change in the primary format in 2008.
Results
Our results indicate that the switch to the top two primary reduced the likelihood of having multiple Democratic candidates in a race, reduced the number of “excess” Democratic candidates, but did not have a significant impact on Republican candidates.
Conclusion
With many states revising their primary systems, an understanding of the incentives present under alternative systems is critical. As such, the results presented in this study provide evidence that the top two primary gives the political parties an incentive to discourage excess primary candidates.

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