London Graduate School of Business Studies.
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
1977 The American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 32, Issue 2, pages 371–387, May 1977
How to Cite
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H. (1977), INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION. The Journal of Finance, 32: 371–387. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x
- Issue published online: 30 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
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