• G. Akerlof. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89 (August 1970), 488500.
  • G. Benston. “A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 31 (May 1976), 215231.
  • M. Jensen and W. Meckling. “The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” University of Rochester, Graduate School of Management Working Paper No. GPB-75−3. December 1975.
  • F. Modigliani and M. Miller. “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review, 48 (June 1958), 26197.
  • J. Riley. “Competitive Signalling”, Journal of Economic Theory, 10 (1975).
  • J. Riley. “Informational Equilibrium”. Rand Working Paper R-2059. September 1976.
  • S. Ross. “Some Notes on Financial Incentive-Signalling Models, Activity Choice and Risk Preferences”, Working Paper. University of Pennsylvania, September 1976.
  • M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • A. M. Spence. “Job Market Signaling”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87 (1973), 35579.
  • A. M. Spence. Market Signaling (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974a).
  • A. M. Spence. “Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: Analysis of Efficiency and Distribution”, Journal of Economic Theory, (March 1974b).
  • J. E. Stiglitz. “Information and Economic Analysis,” Technical Report No. 155, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1974.