Sufficient Conditions for Public Information to Have Social Value in a Production and Exchange Economy



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    • Ernst and Whinney Faculty Fellow, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. I wish to thank my dissertation supervisors, Nils Hakansson and James Ohlson for their assistance.


Conditions are derived under which all consumers in a production and exchange economy will prefer (at least weakly) disclosure of public information to no such disclosure. The conditions involve consumer endowments, the allocative efficiency of the financial market, and value maximizing behavior by firms. Cases exist where consumers will prefer disclosure of public information in a production and exchange economy, although they would be indifferent to such disclosure in an otherwise similar pure exchange economy. The difference in results is due purely to the fact that in production and exchange economies, information may be used to reallocate resources across time and firms, thus highlighting the fundamental difference between the role of information in pure exchange and in production and exchange economies.