New York University and Georgia Institute of Technology, respectively. We are grateful for helpful discussions with Avner Kalay, Roy Radner, and Chester Spatt. Our work was partially supported by a research grant from the Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University. Kose John also acknowledges support by a Batterymarch Fellowship.
Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium
Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
1985 The American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 40, Issue 3, pages 863–878, July 1985
How to Cite
JOHN, K. and NACHMAN, D. C. (1985), Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium. The Journal of Finance, 40: 863–878. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05012.x
- Issue published online: 30 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
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