Assistant Professor, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University. This paper is from my dissertation at the University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. I am indebted to John Long, Martin Geisel, and William Meckling, the members of my thesis committee, for their help. I am also grateful to Michael Jensen, Robert McCormick, Espen Eckbo, Walter Oi, William Schwert, Clifford Smith, Jerry Zimmerman, and, in particular, Gregg Jarrell and John J. McConnell for helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank William M. Taylor and the discussant, Richard P. Castanias, for numerous comments on an earlier draft. George Horwich provided crucial data at the crucial moment. Dave Mauer contributed to the data analysis. Finally, but by no means less importantly, my gratitude goes to Karl Brunner, without whom this paper would not have been possible. Generous financial support by the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business at the University of Rochester and by the Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
A Test of the OPEC Cartel Hypothesis: 1974–1983
Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
1985 The American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 40, Issue 3, pages 991–1006, July 1985
How to Cite
LODERER, C. (1985), A Test of the OPEC Cartel Hypothesis: 1974–1983. The Journal of Finance, 40: 991–1006. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05028.x
- Issue published online: 30 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
This paper tests whether the higher oil prices of the last decade could have been the result of producer collusion. We find little evidence that OPEC influenced oil prices during the years of skyrocketing prices (1974–1980), but there is evidence that it did so during the recent years of softening prices (1981–1983).