Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The views expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve System. I am grateful to Mordecai Kurz and members of his student workshop, as well as John Duca, Anjan Thakor, Gregory Udell, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships
Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
1990 The American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 45, Issue 4, pages 1069–1087, September 1990
How to Cite
SHARPE, S. A. (1990), Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships. The Journal of Finance, 45: 1069–1087. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02427.x
- Issue published online: 30 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
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