Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals



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    • Business Programs, Arizona State University West. This paper is based on a dissertation written at the University of Oregon. I would like to thank Wayne Mikkelson, my dissertation chairperson, and the other committee members, Megan Partch, Peggy Wier, and Christopher Ellis, for their support and encouragement. I also thank Rene Stulz and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments. Support was provided in part by the Research and Scholarship Development Fund at Northeastern University.


Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.