Both authors are from the Business School, University of Michigan. They would like to thank M. Bagnoli, S. Bhattacharaya, M. Bradley, H. DeAngelo, E. Han Kim, G. Kaul, G. Niehaus, M. P. Narayanan, J. Stiglitz, and the discussant, M. Fishman, at the Western Finance Meetings in Napa, the editor, R. Stulz, and two anonymous referees for their many helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. They also acknowledge partial financial support of the Michigan Business School.
How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive Strategies in Takeovers
Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
1990 The American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 45, Issue 1, pages 137–156, March 1990
How to Cite
BERKOVITCH, E. and KHANNA, N. (1990), How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive Strategies in Takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 45: 137–156. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05084.x
- Issue published online: 30 APR 2012
- Article first published online: 30 APR 2012
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