University of California, Los Angeles and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would like to thank Jim Brandon, Michael Brennan, Brad Cornell, Darrell Duffie, Francis Longstaff, Jill Ousley, Jerome Powell, Gary Rasmussen, René Stulz, Suresh Sundaresan, Sheridan Titman, Bruce Tuckman, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and/or discussions. Phong Chan, Karen Gess, and Ravi Jain provided excellent research assistance. This research was partially supported by a UCLA Faculty Career Development Award and a research grant from the UCLA Academic Senate. I am solely responsible for any error in this paper.
Treasury Auction Bids and the Salomon Squeeze
Version of Record online: 30 APR 2012
© 1993 the American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 48, Issue 4, pages 1403–1419, September 1993
How to Cite
JEGADEESH, N. (1993), Treasury Auction Bids and the Salomon Squeeze. The Journal of Finance, 48: 1403–1419. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04759.x
- Issue online: 30 APR 2012
- Version of Record online: 30 APR 2012
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