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Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns

  1. RONALD W. MASULIS,
  2. CONG WANG,
  3. FEI XIE*

Article first published online: 14 AUG 2007

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x

Issue

The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance

Volume 62, Issue 4, pages 1851–1889, August 2007

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How to Cite

MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C. and XIE, F. (2007), Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns. The Journal of Finance, 62: 1851–1889. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x

Author Information

* *Ronald W. Masulis is from the Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University; Cong Wang is from the Faculty of Business Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong; and Fei Xie is from the School of Management, George Mason University. We thank an associate editor, an anonymous referee, George Benston, Margaret Blair, Paul Chaney, Bill Christie, Harry DeAngelo, Mara Faccio, Amar Gande, Sreeni Kamma, Veronika Krepely, Craig Lewis, Xi Li, Micah Officer, Hans Stoll, René Stulz, Randall Thomas, Robert Thompson, and seminar participants at the Accounting and Finance Research Camp at the Australian Graduate School of Management, the American Finance Association annual meetings in Boston, the Conference on International Markets and Corporate Governance at Georgetown University Law School, the JFI/CRES Corporate Governance Conference at Washington University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Emory University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of New South Wales, and Vanderbilt University for helpful comments, and Martijn Cremers and Vinay Nair for providing institutional ownership data. Fei Xie also thanks Haibo Tang from Yale University for his assistance in conducting early analyses on this topic.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 14 AUG 2007
  2. Article first published online: 14 AUG 2007

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