Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance
Article first published online: 28 SEP 2009
© 2009 the American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 64, Issue 5, pages 2221–2256, October 2009
How to Cite
AGARWAL, V., DANIEL, N. D. and NAIK, N. Y. (2009), Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance. The Journal of Finance, 64: 2221–2256. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01499.x
- Issue published online: 28 SEP 2009
- Article first published online: 28 SEP 2009
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