Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse
Article first published online: 9 NOV 2010
© 2010 the American Finance Association
The Journal of Finance
Volume 65, Issue 6, pages 2015–2050, December 2010
How to Cite
DITTMANN, I., MAUG, E. and SPALT, O. (2010), Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse. The Journal of Finance, 65: 2015–2050. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01609.x
- Issue published online: 9 NOV 2010
- Article first published online: 9 NOV 2010
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