Philippon and Schnabl are with New York University, NBER, and CEPR. We thank seminar participants at the 2010 American Finance Association Meeting, Baruch College, the CEPR Bank Crisis Prevention and Resolution Conference, the CEPR Gerzensee Corporate Finance Meeting, the CEPR-HSG Corporate Finance and Economic Performance Conference, the Federal Reserve Chicago Bank Structure and Competition Conference, Harvard University, the NBER Asset Pricing and Corporate Finance Meeting, the NBER Monetary Economics Program Meeting, New York University, the New York Federal Reserve Liquidity Working Group, Princeton University, the OeNB Bank Resolution Workshop, the UBC Summer Finance Conference, the University of Binghamton, the University of Chicago, and the University of Rochester, and our discussants Marco Becht, Arnoud W.A. Boot, Max Bruche, Ron Giammarino, Itay Goldstein, Adriano Rampini, Gustav Sigurdsson, Juan Sole, and Luigi Zingales for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful for comments from an anonymous referee, an Associated Editor, and the Editor (Campbell Harvey). An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “Efficient Bank Recapitalization.”
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Efficient Recapitalization
Article first published online: 11 JAN 2013
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01793.x
© 2013 The American Finance Association
Additional Information
How to Cite
PHILIPPON, T. and SCHNABL, P. (2013), Efficient Recapitalization. The Journal of Finance, 68: 1–42. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01793.x
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Philippon and Schnabl are with New York University, NBER, and CEPR. We thank seminar participants at the 2010 American Finance Association Meeting, Baruch College, the CEPR Bank Crisis Prevention and Resolution Conference, the CEPR Gerzensee Corporate Finance Meeting, the CEPR-HSG Corporate Finance and Economic Performance Conference, the Federal Reserve Chicago Bank Structure and Competition Conference, Harvard University, the NBER Asset Pricing and Corporate Finance Meeting, the NBER Monetary Economics Program Meeting, New York University, the New York Federal Reserve Liquidity Working Group, Princeton University, the OeNB Bank Resolution Workshop, the UBC Summer Finance Conference, the University of Binghamton, the University of Chicago, and the University of Rochester, and our discussants Marco Becht, Arnoud W.A. Boot, Max Bruche, Ron Giammarino, Itay Goldstein, Adriano Rampini, Gustav Sigurdsson, Juan Sole, and Luigi Zingales for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful for comments from an anonymous referee, an Associated Editor, and the Editor (Campbell Harvey). An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “Efficient Bank Recapitalization.”
Publication History
- Issue published online: 11 JAN 2013
- Article first published online: 11 JAN 2013
- Accepted manuscript online: 27 DEC 2012 05:42AM EST
- Initial submission: November 26, 2010; Final version received: August 8, 2012
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