We thank two referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. This research was supported by the CIHR (Canadian Institutes of Health Research) in conjunction with Genome Canada, Grant number FFO 62452 (Program-Facing Our Future: Genetics, Ethics, Law and Society). Opinions expressed are those of the authors and are not meant to necessarily reflect those of the CIHR or Genome Canada. This article was subject to anonymous peer review.
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Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets
Article first published online: 16 NOV 2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6296.2005.00057.x
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How to Cite
Hoy, M. and Ruse, M. (2005), Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets. Risk Management and Insurance Review, 8: 211–237. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6296.2005.00057.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 16 NOV 2005
- Article first published online: 16 NOV 2005
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Abstract
The debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to use results of genetic tests for underwriting purposes is both lively and increasingly relevant as both technology and lawmaking efforts are progressing rapidly. In this article we outline the primary economic and non-economic arguments made in favor of and against allowing insurers to risk-rate premiums on the basis of genetic test results. While economic analysis has much to offer in enlightening this debate and informing policy makers, we argue that such work must be cast within the overall perspective of the genetic testing debate. Moreover, despite substantial strides by economists in understanding the role of information in the way insurance markets operate, much work still needs to be done in order for economic analysis to be confidently applied to the looming social issues of the continuing genetic revolution.