Get access

Must Love Kill the Family Firm? Some Exploratory Evidence

Authors


Vikas Mehrotra, tel.: +1 (780) 492-2976; e-mail: vmehrotr@ualberta.ca, to Randall Morck at randall.morck@ualberta.ca, to Jungwook Shim at sim0625@gmail.com, and to Yupana Wiwattanakantang at bizyw@nus.edu.sg.

Abstract

Family firms depend on a succession of capable heirs to stay afloat. If talent and IQ are inherited, this problem is mitigated. If, however, progeny talent and IQ display mean reversion (or worse), family firms are eventually doomed. Since family firms persist, solutions to this succession problem must exist. We submit that marriage can transfuse outside talent and reinvigorate family firms. This implies that changes to the institution of marriage—notably, a decline in arranged marriages in favor of marriages for “love”—bode ill for the survival of family firms. Consistent with this, the predominance of family firms correlates strongly across countries with plausible proxies for arranged marriage norms.

Ancillary