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SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS
Article first published online: 20 JAN 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01002.x
© 2010 by the European Economic Association
Additional Information
How to Cite
de Jong, P., Lindeboom, M. and van der Klaauw, B. (2011), SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9: 106–129. doi: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01002.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 20 JAN 2011
- Article first published online: 20 JAN 2011
Keywords:
- C93;
- H53;
- I18
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was set up wherein two of the 26 Dutch regions caseworkers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Furthermore, stricter screening improves targeting efficiency without inducing negative spillover effects on the inflow into unemployment insurance.