This article employs Antonionian skepticism to address an infelicity dogging Foucault's standpoint on regimes of truth (ROTs). In the process of doing this it formulates the nuts and bolts of an anthropology of hypocrisy to distinguish the truths from the “truths” of ROTs. Argument proceeds by first exploring Foucault's understanding of ROTs. Next it considers the work of three contributors to this issue that interrogate different aspects of the Liberal ROT helping to pinpoint a problem with Foucault's usage of the term. Finally, it suggests how an anthropology of hypocrisy makes Foucault's approach more Boasian and more useful.
If you can't find a tool you're looking for, please click the link at the top of the page to "Go to old article view". Alternatively, view our Knowledge Base articles for additional help. Your feedback is important to us, so please let us know if you have comments or ideas for improvement.