What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents’ Access to Socially Strategic and Non-Strategic Information
Version of Record online: 29 MAR 2012
Copyright © 2012 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Volume 36, Issue 5, pages 846–869, July 2012
How to Cite
Purzycki, B. G., Finkel, D. N., Shaver, J., Wales, N., Cohen, A. B. and Sosis, R. (2012), What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents’ Access to Socially Strategic and Non-Strategic Information. Cognitive Science, 36: 846–869. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01242.x
- Issue online: 3 JUL 2012
- Version of Record online: 29 MAR 2012
- Received 5 July 2010; received in revised form 25 August 2011; accepted 26 August 2011
- Cognitive science of religion;
- Socially strategic information;
- Supernatural agents;
- Supernatural punishment;
- Theory of mind
Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents’ socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents’ knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times to questions about the knowledge attributed to four different agents—God, Santa Claus, a fictional surveillance government, and omniscient but non-interfering aliens—that vary in their omniscience, moral concern, ability to punish, and how supernatural they are. As anticipated, participants respond more quickly to questions about agents’ socially strategic knowledge than non-strategic knowledge, but only when agents are able to punish.