SOME MISTAKES GO UNPUNISHED: THE EVOLUTION OF “ALL OR NOTHING” SIGNALLING
Article first published online: 14 JUL 2011
© 2011 The Author(s). Evolution© 2011 The Society for the Study of Evolution.
Volume 65, Issue 10, pages 2743–2749, October 2011
How to Cite
Broom, M. and Ruxton, G. D. (2011), SOME MISTAKES GO UNPUNISHED: THE EVOLUTION OF “ALL OR NOTHING” SIGNALLING. Evolution, 65: 2743–2749. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01377.x
- Issue published online: 3 OCT 2011
- Article first published online: 14 JUL 2011
- Accepted manuscript online: 7 JUN 2011 07:48AM EST
- Received March 22, 2011, Accepted May 27, 2011
- cost of signaling;
- handicap principle;
- signal honesty
Many models of honest signaling, based on Zahavi's handicap principle, predict that if receivers are interested in a quality that shows continuous variation across the population of signalers, then the distribution of signal intensities will also be continuous. However, it has previously been noted that this prediction does not agree with empirical observation in many signaling systems, where signals are limited to a small number of levels despite continuous variation in the trait being signaled. Typically, there is a critical value of the trait, with all individuals with trait values on one side of the threshold using the same cheap signal, and all those with trait values on the other side of the threshold using the same expensive signal. It has already been demonstrated that these classical models naturally predict such “all-or-nothing signaling” if it is additionally assumed that receivers suffer from perceptual error in evaluating signal strength. We show that such all-or-nothing signaling is also predicted if receivers are limited to responding to the signals in one of two ways. We suggest that many ecological situations (such as the decision to attack the signaler or not, or mate with the signaler or not) involve such binary choices.