Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Daniel J. Isenberg, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Soldiers Field Road, Boston, MA 02163.
Levels of Analysis of Pluralistic Ignorance Phenomena: The Case of Receptiveness to Interpersonal Feedback1
Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Volume 10, Issue 6, pages 457–467, December 1980
How to Cite
Isenberg, D. J. (1980), Levels of Analysis of Pluralistic Ignorance Phenomena: The Case of Receptiveness to Interpersonal Feedback. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 10: 457–467. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1980.tb00725.x
Part of this research (supported in part by NSF BNS77–03271, David A. Kenny, Principal Investigator) was conducted while the author was at the Israel Institute of Work Productivity, Tel Aviv, Israel. The author wishes to thank Yoram Gordon for his help in collecting the data, Smedar Levin for back-translating the questionnaire from English to Hebrew, Dave Kenny for his extensive advice on the methodological aspects of this research, and Dave Kenny, Charles Judd, Robert Rosenthal, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier manuscripts.
- Issue published online: 31 JUL 2006
- Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
Data were collected from 32 groups nested within two cultural contexts on pluralistic ignorance regarding receptiveness to various kinds of interpersonal feedback. Pluralistic ignorance was operationalized as the average difference between ratings of own receptiveness and ratings of the perceived receptiveness of others within a particular group. An overall effect of pluralistic ignorance was found which varied as a function of valence (whether the feedback was positive or negative) and mode (whether the feedback concerned ideas, behaviors, or feelings). Pluralistic ignorance was greater when the feedback was negative and when the feedback concerned feelings. In addition, pluralistic ignorance was found to vary as a function of cultural context. On the other hand, pluralistic ignorance did not vary at all as a function of groups, contrary to what was expected given previous conceptualizations of pluralistic ignorance. The data were taken as evidence that pluralistic ignorance in receptiveness to feedback may be due to social desirability and certain cognitive biases.