1559-1816/asset/cover.gif?v=1&s=14dd6984982738749ebbe29363a927e201c5bb57 "Journal of Applied Social Psychology")
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Maryellen Kinnally, Lesley Reid, and Scott Zimmerman in conducting this experiment Andrew Baum, Michelle Buck, Bernadette Park, and an anonymous reviewer provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Parts of the manuscript were written while the first author attended the Summer Institute on Dispute Resolution and Negotiation held by the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, July-August 1992. Funds for support of the Institute were provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
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False Consensus, Stereotypic Cues, and the Perception of Integrative Potential in Negotiation†
Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1997.tb01632.x
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How to Cite
Bottom, W. P. and Paese, P. W. (1997), False Consensus, Stereotypic Cues, and the Perception of Integrative Potential in Negotiation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27: 1919–1940. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1997.tb01632.x
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Publication History
- Issue published online: 31 JUL 2006
- Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
- Abstract
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We argue that negotiators' fixed-sum perceptions are caused by the same judgment process that creates false consensus. Bargainers' reliance on their own preferences as a cue to others' preferences leads them to anticipate a fixed-sum conflict. When presented with stereotypic cues, subjects in a negotiating experiment anticipated the variable-sum nature of the task and subsequently realized highly efficient settlements extremely quickly. Surprisingly, even when the party's preferences were unrepresentative of the stereotype, agreements were no less efficient than in the absence of the cue. The implications of these findings for bargaining research and practice are discussed.