This research was financially supported by grants from the Center for Public Sector Research, Goteborg University, Sweden. The authors thank Mark Van Vugt, Paul Van Lange, and rwo anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on previous versions of this manuscript.
Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas When Equality Is Perceived as Unfair1
Version of Record online: 31 JUL 2006
Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Volume 31, Issue 3, pages 649–666, March 2001
How to Cite
Eek, D., Biel, A. and Gärling, T. (2001), Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas When Equality Is Perceived as Unfair. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31: 649–666. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2001.tb02060.x
- Issue online: 31 JUL 2006
- Version of Record online: 31 JUL 2006
Three experiments examined the hypothesis that in an asymmetric social dilemma, perceived fairness of the distribution promotes cooperation. In support of the hypothesis, Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to voluntarily and anonymously pay for child care was related to ratings of perceived fairness of equal and equitable distributions of the quality of child care when it was a public good (provided by the municipality) or a market good (provided by a private business). Study 1 also showed that an equal distribution of the public good was perceived to be fairer than an equal distribution of the market good, whereas the reverse was true for an equitable distribution. Study 2 showed that when quality differences were explicit, an equitable distribution was perceived as fairer than an equal distribution. Study 3 showed that an equitable distribution of quantity of child care was perceived to be fairer and increased willingness to pay as compared to an equal distribution.