This research was supported by Grant A79802702 from the Australian Research Council. The authors thank G. Berman and B. Cutler, whose trial transcripts provided a starting point for those developed for this study.
Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Witness Group Identity on Mock-Juror Judgments1
Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Volume 34, Issue 3, pages 493–513, March 2004
How to Cite
Brewer, N. and Hupfeld, R. M. (2004), Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Witness Group Identity on Mock-Juror Judgments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34: 493–513. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02558.x
- Issue published online: 31 JUL 2006
- Article first published online: 31 JUL 2006
We examined the interaction of testimonial consistency and witness group identity on mock jurors' judgments of witness effectiveness, probability that the defendant committed the crime, and verdict. In a 3 × 2 (Witness Group Identity × Testimonial Consistency) between-groups design, 180 mock jurors heard a trial of a person charged with assault. Although both variables affected judgments, group-identity effects were weak when testimony was characterized by inconsistencies, and they were stronger when testimony was internally consistent but ambiguous. The judgment patterns were consistent with predictions from Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly's (1989) heuristic-systematic processing theory, suggesting that heuristic processing would bias systematic processing when the evidence was not decisive.