Evolution of land tenure institutions and development of agroforestry: evidence from customary land areas of Sumatra

  1. Keijiro Otsuka1,†,*,
  2. S. Suyanto2,
  3. Tetsushi Sonobe3,
  4. Thomas P. Tomich2

Article first published online: 28 JUN 2008

DOI: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2001.tb00237.x

Issue

Agricultural Economics

Agricultural Economics

Volume 25, Issue 1, pages 85–101, June 2000

Additional Information

How to Cite

Otsuka, K., Suyanto, S., Sonobe, T. and Tomich, T. P. (2000), Evolution of land tenure institutions and development of agroforestry: evidence from customary land areas of Sumatra. Agricultural Economics, 25: 85–101. doi: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2001.tb00237.x

Author Information

  1. 1

    Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1–1 Minami Ohsawa, Hachiohji, Tokyo 192–0397, Japan

  2. 2

    International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, Southeast Asian Regional Research Programme, P.O. Box 161, Bogor 16001, Indonesia

  3. 3

    Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1–1 Minami Ohsawa, Hachiohji, Tokyo 192–0397, Japan

  1. †

    Also, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC 20006, USA.

* * Corresponding author. Tel.: +81-426-77-2324; fax: +81-426-77-2304. E-mail address: otsuka-keijiro@c.metro-u.ac.jp (K. Otsuka)

  • †

    Also, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC 20006, USA.

  • As will become clearer, there are more similarities than dissimilarities between land tenure institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Sumatra. See, e.g. Shepherd (1991) and Bassett (1993) for an overview of land tenure institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 28 JUN 2008
  2. Article first published online: 28 JUN 2008
  3. Received 17 September 1999; received in revised form 7 June 2000; accepted 23 June 2000

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Keywords:

  • Customary land tenure;
  • Land rights;
  • Tree planting;
  • Agroforestry;
  • Sumatra

Abstract

It is widely believed that land tenure insecurity under a customary tenure system leads to a socially inefficient resource allocation. This article demonstrates that the practice of granting secure individual ownership to tree planters spurs earlier tree planting, which is inefficient from the private point of view but could be efficient from the viewpoint of the global environment. Regression analysis, based on primary data collected in Sumatra, indicates that an expected increase in tenure security in fact led to early tree planting. It is also found that customary land tenure institutions have been evolving towards greater tenure security responding to increasing scarcity of land.

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