LICOS Center for Institutions and Economic Performance, University of Leuven (KUL), Belgium.
Market power and rents in global supply chains
Article first published online: 9 NOV 2010
© 2010 International Association of Agricultural Economists
Volume 41, Issue Supplement s1, pages 109–120, November 2010
How to Cite
Swinnen, J. F.M. and Vandeplas, A. (2010), Market power and rents in global supply chains. Agricultural Economics, 41: 109–120. doi: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00493.x
- Issue published online: 9 NOV 2010
- Article first published online: 9 NOV 2010
- Market power;
- Food supply chains;
- Rent distribution
Market power and competition policy in food supply chains has emerged as an important economic issue in economics, and a highly sensitive item on the policy agenda. Consolidation is taking place in the food industry, both in high-income countries and in emerging economies, but the impact of concentration in global food chains on efficiency and rent distribution is more nuanced and complex than often claimed. We review the literature and extend it by developing a model which explicitly takes into account market imperfections and contract enforcement problems in supply chains. Increased competition benefits farms by improving contract conditions, but contract enforcement becomes more complicated.