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Keywords:

  • C30;
  • C78;
  • F13;
  • Q17
  • Agricultural products;
  • Bilateral trade;
  • Bargaining games;
  • TBT;
  • SPS

Abstract

In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power.