Special thanks to Robert Cooter, Robert MacCoun, and Philip Tetlock from the University of California, Berkeley. For their insightful comments and suggestions, I thank Hadar Aviram, Adam Badawi, Rena Bogoch, Meir Dan-Cohen, Ted Eisenberg, Assaf Hamdani, Valerie Hans, Gilad Hirschberger, Alan Hyde, Miri Gur-Arie, Mark Lemley, Peter Menell, Oren Perez, Ilana Ritov, Daniel Rubinfeld, AnnaLee Saxenian, Alois Stutzer, David Teece, Tim Urdan, Frank Zimring, and the participants of the Conference on Behavioral Law and Economics at the University of Haifa and Conference of Empirical Legal Studies, University of Texas at Austin. For their excellent help, I thank my research assistants, Zev Iversen, Nitzan Woulkan, Roy Grosberger, and Omer Wagner. For statistical consulting, I thank Tammy Shterental. The article was presented in the First Conference of Empirical Legal Studies, University of Texas at Austin, October 2006.
The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus
Article first published online: 5 MAR 2009
© 2009, Copyright the Author. Journal compilation © 2009, Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume 6, Issue 1, pages 177–212, March 2009
How to Cite
Feldman, Y. (2009), The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 6: 177–212. doi: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01141.x
- Issue published online: 5 MAR 2009
- Article first published online: 5 MAR 2009
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