I thank Douglas Baird, Omri Ben-Shahar, Tony Casey, Richard Epstein, Mary Anne Franks, Todd Henderson, Jon Klick, Saul Levmore, Anup Malani, Tom Miles, Adam Muchmore, Anthony Niblett, Eric Posner, Arden Rowell, audiences at the 2009 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, the University of Chicago Law School, UCLA School of Law, Washington University School of Law, Cardozo School of Law, the University of Georgia School of Law, Florida State University College of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law, several franchise attorneys who wish to remain anonymous, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of JELS for helpful comments and discussion and I thank Michael Popper for exellent research assistance. I also thank Edith Wiseman of FRANdata for her help in procuring the franchise contracts used in this study and the John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics at the University of Chicago Law School for generous financial assistance. All errors are my own.
Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from Franchising
Article first published online: 18 NOV 2010
© 2010, Copyright the Author. Journal compilation © 2010, Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume 7, Issue 4, pages 743–785, December 2010
How to Cite
Badawi, A. B. (2010), Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from Franchising. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7: 743–785. doi: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01194.x
- Issue published online: 18 NOV 2010
- Article first published online: 18 NOV 2010