Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight
Version of Record online: 22 NOV 2011
Copyright © 2011 Cornell Law School and Wiley Subscription Services, Inc.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Special Issue: Judgment by the Numbers: Converting Qualitative to Quantitative Judgments in Law
Volume 8, Issue Supplement s1, pages 72–98, December 2011
How to Cite
Rachlinski, J. J., Guthrie, C. and Wistrich, A. J. (2011), Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 8: 72–98. doi: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2011.01230.x
- Issue online: 22 NOV 2011
- Version of Record online: 22 NOV 2011
When judges assess probable cause, they must do so either in foresight (when determining whether to issue a warrant) or in hindsight (when determining whether to allow the admission of evidence obtained without a search warrant). Although the legal standard for probable cause is the same, and the facts that might support cause are the same, judges who assess probable cause in hindsight invariably know whether a search produced incriminating evidence or not. Research on the hindsight bias suggests that judges will be unable to set aside this knowledge and judge probable cause as if they were working in foresight. In this article, we present three experiments in which we asked 900 state and federal judges to make judgments of probable cause either in foresight or in hindsight, in hypothetical cases. Surprisingly, we found that that judges make similar rulings on probable cause in foresight and in hindsight. We also found that hindsight appears to cloud judges' abilities to assess the likely outcome of the search, but hindsight does not influence their legal judgments.