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Migration Decisions Within Dual-Earner Partnerships: A Test of Bargaining Theory

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Errata

This article is corrected by:

  1. Errata: Erratum Volume 73, Issue 4, I–III, Article first published online: 15 July 2011

  • *

    Department of Sociology, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstr. 10, 78457, Konstanz, Germany.

  • **

    Department of Sociology, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstr. 10, 78457, Konstanz, Germany.

  • This article was edited by Cheryl Buehler.

School of Business and Economics, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Findelgasse 7/9, 90402 Nuremberg, Germany.

Abstract

This article focuses on the problems faced by dual-earner partnerships arising from the regional coordination of the partners' careers. It is still unknown whether the fact that couples are less mobile than singles is caused by homogeneous preferences within couples or by a process of balancing conflicting interests. Consequently, we analyze the potential conflicts provoked by work-related migration incentives. We test hypotheses derived from bargaining theory using quasi-experimental data from a factorial survey of nearly 280 European couples. Our results support the bargaining approach and confirm that asymmetrical shifts in bargaining power drive the potential for conflict. Women's willingness to move is generally less than men's, but the impact of employment prospects differs only slightly by gender.

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