AUTHOR'S NOTE: A previous version of this article was presented at the 2003 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. I wish to thank David Nixon, Julie Flowers, the discussants at the Midwest Political Science Association, and the editor and anonymous reviewers at Presidential Studies Quarterly for their helpful comments.
Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power
Article first published online: 1 NOV 2006
Presidential Studies Quarterly
Volume 36, Issue 4, pages 670–680, December 2006
How to Cite
CORLEY, P. C. (2006), Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36: 670–680. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.02573.x
- Issue published online: 1 NOV 2006
- Article first published online: 1 NOV 2006
This research note attempts to determine under what conditions presidents will use the unilateral tool of recess appointments, specifically to independent agencies. Multivariate analysis reveals that, after controlling for the effects of other variables, presidents are more likely to make a recess appointment if they lack partisan support in the Senate and when they have high public approval. Recess appointments are not cost free and, consequently, presidents use this power strategically and sparingly.