I am grateful to an anonymous referee, Yuji Fujinaka, and participants of the First Symposium on Mechanism Design and Social Choice at Keio University for their helpful comments. I also thank Shuhei Otani for his useful advice on improving Proposition 1 (iii). This research was supported by the Seimaikai foundation and in part by KAKENHI (24220003), which are gratefully acknowledged.
Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
Version of Record online: 22 AUG 2013
International Journal of Economic Theory
Volume 9, Issue 3, pages 255–265, September 2013
How to Cite
Sakai, T. (2013), Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price. International Journal of Economic Theory, 9: 255–265. doi: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x
- Issue online: 22 AUG 2013
- Version of Record online: 22 AUG 2013
- Manuscript Accepted: 26 NOV 2012
- Seimaikai foundation. Grant Number: KAKENHI (24220003)
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