Strand, Jonathan R. and John P. Tuman. (2012) Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in an International Organization: The Case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00173.x
This study examines the relationship between Japanese foreign aid disbursement and recipient state membership and voting in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Focusing on 104 countries for the period 1994–2005, we investigate whether Japan gives more aid to IWC members that vote with Japan. The effects of the independent variables are estimated with a linear mixed regression model. Controlling for other possible influences on official development assistance (ODA) disbursements, and employing different measures of dyadic voting similarity, the study finds Japanese aid concentrates in members of the IWC that are microstates. The findings of the paper also indicate that microstate members of the IWC who align their votes with Japan are more likely to receive Japanese ODA. By demonstrating that Japan’s strategy is focused on microstates, the study provides a more refined understanding of the mechanisms Japan employs to end the IWC’s moratorium on commercial whaling.