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MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES, MONITORING, AND RISK BEARING IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING FIRMS

Authors

  • Randolph P. Beatty,

    1. is the Distinguished Professor of Accounting at the E.L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University.
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  • Edward J. Zajac

    1. is the James F. Beré Professor of Organization Behavior at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.
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    • *

      This paper draws on “Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings,” Randolph P. Beatty and Edward J. Zajac, originally published in Administrative Science Quarterly, June 1994. Copyright (c) 1994 by Cornell University.


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