Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Tübingen, Bursagasse 1, D-72070 Tübingen, Germany. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at conferences in Karlovy Vary (Czeck Republic) in September 1993 and in Neuchâtel (Switzerland) in November 1993. We would like to thank the participants for helpful comments. We would also like to thank Peter Simons and Michael McGettigan for their assistance in checking the English of this article.
Object-dependent and Property dependent Contents
Version of Record online: 23 MAY 2005
Volume 48, Issue 3-4, pages 185–208, September 1994
How to Cite
Bruns, M. and Soldati, G. (1994), Object-dependent and Property dependent Contents. Dialectica, 48: 185–208. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1994.tb00146.x
- Issue online: 23 MAY 2005
- Version of Record online: 23 MAY 2005
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In a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth-value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something (its mode of presentation), and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra- and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We suggest that the divide be based on ontological considerations related to the way content depends on external factors. There is a fundamental difference, we submit, between object-dependent and property-dependent contents. The requirements concerning modes of presentation as well as cognitive significance can be met by one kind of content. This content, it will appear, is property-dependent, but never object-dependent.