A posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument
Article first published online: 23 JUN 2005
Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 41–55, March 2003
How to Cite
GARCÍA-ENCINAS, M.J. (2003), A posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument. Dialectica, 57: 41–55. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00254.x
- Issue published online: 23 JUN 2005
- Article first published online: 23 JUN 2005
The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms.