Is the Object Concept Formal?
Version of Record online: 23 JUN 2005
Volume 58, Issue 3, pages 383–394, September 2004
How to Cite
Casati, R. (2004), Is the Object Concept Formal?. Dialectica, 58: 383–394. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00312.x
- Issue online: 23 JUN 2005
- Version of Record online: 23 JUN 2005
This review article explores several senses in which it can be held that the (actual, psychological) concept of an object is a formal concept, as opposed, here, to being a sortal concept. Some recent positions both from the philosophical and the psychological literature are analyzed: Object-sortalism (Xu), quasi-sortalist reductive strategies (Bloom), qualified sortalism (Wiggins), demonstrative theories (Fodor), and anti-sortalism (Ayers).